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THE RETURN TO EUROPE 
OR THE CRlSlS OF ClVlLIZATION° 
Five years already have passed. since lhe Soviel empire collapsed down 
and the European situation dramatically changcd. Looking back at what have 
experienced during this period and trying lO understand what really happened 
aI' ter lhe spectre 01' communism. which was going around Europe for almost 
one and half centuries tinally disappeared. we should first realize another 
important change which took place in the meantime: Thcre is a remarkable 
ditlerence between our perception 01' that event in the very beginning 01' lhis 
new era and now. 
ln 1990, we were told repeatedly by prominent Western observes 01' the 
events in East-Central Europe that there was nothing particularly original i~ the 
revolutions of 1989: «Wilh ali the fuss and noise. not a single new ideia has 
come out af Eastern Europe in 1989»( I l. What happened there and what was 
greeted with great enthusiasm and joy, was understood as a liberatian. as a 
restoration of an already known and exisling Weslern liberal order. «The ideas 
whose time has come are old, familiar. wcll-tcsted ones ~ (It is lhe new ideas 
whose time has passed)>>e). 
ln 1995 however. the overall piclurc of East-Ccntral Europe is delinitely 
kss rosy lhan iI was five ycars ago and the role played by ali lhese «old well-
-tested ideas» is not at ali unequivocal and entirely unproblematic. What we 
observe in East-Central Europe nowadays, are n01 only their more or less 
successful «implcrnentations» ~ i.e. politicai and economic reforms essential1y 
«00 track», in most of the post-communist countries - hut also many other, 
ralher disturhing and unexpected phenomena. There is the unprecedented 
Bosnian debacle - not only a disastrous product of nationalisrn which rcsur-
(I) Frl!nch historian François Furet, quoted on page 27 ln Ralf Dnhrendorf (1990), Reflections on 
the Revolutioll in Europe. Chatto and Windus: Lundon. 
(!) A quoration from English scholar Timothy Garton Ash, oro dL above ruge 28. 
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faced in many parIs 01' Easl-Central Europe afler lhe collapse 01' communisl 
ideology, bul «lhe grralest collective security failure of lhe West since the 
1930's», as one high-ranked U.S. otlicial put iI recenrly('). 
Should wc perceive lhe polilical processes in lhe posl-communist countries 
only as more ar less successful «transitions to democracy»'? Or is there much 
more aI stake here Ihan only lhe «weslernization» 01' lhe Easl, but also olher 
transilions have to be take11 i11tO eonsideration" Should lhe collapse of commu-
nism be understood as the victory of lhe «old» weslern world over lhe hubris 
of utopias and the IOlalitarian deformation of «well-Iesled» European politicai 
traditions? Or should wc sec here at lhe same time lhe crucial moment in the 
historical process which slarled already in the beginning of the twentielh 
century, and whose consequence is rhar bolh politically and spirilually Eurape 
IOSI her until then undisputed and undisputable dominant position in lhe world? 
Is lhe process going on in Europe afler lhe collapse 01' communism, a mere 
home-coming of «POsl-tolalilarians» fram lheir Babylonian captivity lo the 
nice, prosperous, and safe haven of the West? Or is lhe current rapprochemenl 
of East and West in Europc laking place at a moment 01' profou11d crisis in 
European civilization, and Europeans cannot go. as they rnight Iike 10, «back 
10 the fUlure», bul find lhemselves in an entirely new, unprecedcnled, and lhus 
unknown situation? 
The aim of lhis paper is lo look aI bOlh models - «relurn lo Eurdpe» and 
«crisis of European civilization» - more closely and to point to some of lheir 
practical and/or theoretical implications. My guidc as far as «retum to Europc» 
is concerned. will be Ralf Dahrendorf, i.e. I will depart from the concepr of 
«open society» coined by his teacher, Karl Popper. and Dahrendorfs descrip-
tioo 01' lhe politicaI processes in East-Central Europe as the «re-opening» of 
socielies which were kepl closed under totalilarian dominarion. 
The theme af crisis ar European civilization or European mankind was 
introduced into the philosophy 01' our century by Edmund Husserl and then 
picked up and developed by many olhers. I will mention here from Ihree 
thinkers, who in spile of m.ny significam differences. have somelhing essential 
in common: Hannah Arendl. Jan Palocka and Erich Voegelin. They ali carne 
from Central Europe. They ali were members 01' lhe sarne generation, being 
boro in rhe beginning of our century and passing away prior to rhe collapse of 
communism (Arendt and p.tocka in lhe sevenries and Voegelin in lhe eighties). 
They could ali observe lhe emergence of lOlalilarianism in lhe counlries 01' lheir 
(') Richard Holbrooke: Americu. A Europcun Power. Foreign Affairs. March/ April 1995. 
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origin and lhe lotalitarian form af governrnent fundamcntally innuenced their 
live,. They ali wcre confronted Wilh the challenge of Husserlian phenomeno-
logy and were convinced that in order to understand lhe rools or contemporary 
politicai crises in Europe, it is necessary LO return lo lhe immediate experience 
of human matters and «to recapture the reality»("'). 
While lhe «return to Europe» approach seems to bc vcry prcsent in currcnt 
politicai debates and dccision-making processes throughout East Central Eu-
rope - it underlies practically ali poli tiçal programs and conceptions lhe Easl 
Central European politicians are coming forth with and trying to scll to the 
public. both domeslically and illlernalionally - ali warning Slgnals of the crisis 
of European civilizatian seem to be ralhe r suppresseu uml marginalized in lhe 
post-communist politicai debates. This is on the one hand perfcclly understand-
able. On the olher hand, when wc realize whcre do we 'land five years afler, 
gives tiS, in my view, enough reasons to hecome again more aware 01' and more 
scnsitive to cxactly this aspect of current European situation. 
II 
«What does it ali mean, and where is it going to lead (you want to know)'! 
Are we nol witnessing a process of dissolution without anything laking lhe 
place of the old and admilledly dismal slruclures'),,(') Wilh lhese quesliohs, 
Ralf Dahrendorf. a promincnl British politicai s.cholar. opens his Reflectim!.'! 01/ 
lhe Revolutioll in Europe, in my view the most lucid account 01' the collapse of 
communism in 1989, written in lhe form of a lellcr ualed in Apri I 1990, 
«intentcd to have been sent to a genl1eman in Warsaw». The modcl for this 
writing was Edmund Burke, who did similar thing in 1790 when he in a similar 
lctter (<<intended to have becn scnt to a gcntleman in Paris»). articulated his 
opinions cOllccrning the French Revolution: 
« ••• Ihough I do most heartily ~I'ish lflUI Frallce ma)' be allinwTed hy a spiril 
of rationallibert}', and that /Ihink you !Joulld. iII ali hOI1t!sl poliey, to provide 
a permanenf body iII l-vhich lhm spiril ma)' reside. (lIul an effecfuol urgem hy 
which ir way aet, it is my mü:fortuf1e lo cnlerlain gr~at dou bIs COl1cerl1lllg 
several material poinls in your late fransactions. »C') 
(4) E Voegelin: AutobiographiC'ul rel1cctions. 
C) Pa.ge 4, Ralr Duhrendorf (1990). 
(') Selected Works ofEumund Bllrkc. Volume I (1905). Rencctions Oll the Frelll:h Revolution. 
Mcthucn & Co.: Lonuon. puge 14. 
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Dahrendorfs message is pretty c1ear: as far as European revolutions are 
concerned, nothing much has changed betwecn 1970 and 1990. The central 
problem 01' post-communist countries. returning aI' ter deeades 01' forced sepa-
ration to Europe is apparently thc one which has occupied the minds 01' ali 
modem European revolutionaries: How «to provi de a pennanent body in which 
a spirit 01' rational Iiberty may reside»? How to create, after an out-Iived, 
«ancient» regime was displaced or simply reli apart, a new body politic'> How 
to transform a profoundly negative force of revolution into the architectonic 
power 01' lawmaking and city-building? How to follow the American rather 
than the French example in this matter and found a new politicai order «without 
violence and with the help 01' a constitutiom,C)" 
Dahrendorl' was inspired by the Burkeian conservativism: ln times 01' 
revolutionary change, even «when, in the course 01' human events, it becumes 
necessary for one people to dissolve the politicai bands which have connected 
them with another», to paraphrase the opening sentence 01' American Deelara-
tion 01' Independence, it is law and tradition (and nat utopian politicai doc-
trines) which only can constitute a solid basis for human libcrty and frce 
politicai institutions. East-Central Europeans can only succecd in their revolu-
tions - i.c. aflcr they managed to dissolve ali connections with the aneient 
regimes - if they reintroduee the rule 01' law in their countries, rcncw ali 
institutions 01' freedom in their societies, restore the politicai culture' bascd on 
civic values and the virtues of citizenship. in short, ir lhey are able to transl'orm 
the whole social rabrie inhercritcd rmm lhe andem régime and become once 
again an «open society». From Dahrendorfs point 01' view the bottom-line of 
lhe story which is going (ln in East Central Europe is simple: lhe societies 
which have been c/osed for decades are now reopening again. 
Eastern Europe had to undergo a drastic and, in a way. an artifidal change 
during the period (lI' communism. What happencd was historically unique and 
unprecedentcd: the totalitarian regimes which carne to power in ali countries in 
the zone of Soviet innuencc(K), succecded to cJose their societies. Seeing the 
basic source of their legitimacy in the utopian ideology of Marxisrn-Lcninisrn, 
e) crr. Hannah Aremh, What is Authorily. ln: Belween PUSI and Future Six Exercises in Politicai 
Thought. Tre Vicking Press New York, 1961. page 140. 
(~) And Ihm !neallt firsl «salellizatioJl}>. Le_ «binding 01' the region's slates to lhe Soviet Union». 
am! Ihan «sovietizalion», i.e. <:4he transformation 01' the regions's dorne.';{k. politicaI. economk :md 
sodal struclures, instilulions, and patlerns acconJing to Soviel norms and values.» - crr. Charles Gali: 
The Block Ihal Failed. Soviet-Easl Europeun Relations in Transition. Indiana University Press, 
Bloominglon & Indianapolis 1490, ruges 9-23. 
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using the most horrible methads af social engineering. cummitüng cnmes 
against humanity, the totalitarian rulers linally sllcceeded in paralysing practi-
cally ali institutions which are, under the normal condilions. an indispensable 
part of ali bodies politic. They liquidaled not only ali their opponcnls in lhe 
power struggle, but also ali «soft» instilutions of civil sociely. They disabled 
not only the mechanism of parliamentary democracy (where criticism of the 
government and replaceabilily 01' lhose in power by others with differenl 
policies are the necessary conditions) bUl also destroycd ali mechanisms and 
structures, whose function is not to compete for polilical power bUl simply to 
make the politicai body «open» - i.e. lo make il responsive to ali insligation 
coming from outside or from within and capable 01' self-relleclion and self-
transformation. Politics in the closed society, instead 01' being «a hYPolhesis 
which is pennanently tested against reality and corrected in the lighl 01' 
experience», in the words of Ralf Dahrendort's teacher in the matters 01' open 
society, Karl Popper, becomes apure lechnology 01' rule and dominion. The 
public space was destroyed and what remained was lhe adminislralion 01' li1'e 
functions of lhe «socialized» human collectivc. 
ln the course of time, however, this almost perkcl stability lurned to be 
even from the paint af view af its own preservation. thc socialism's mosl 
serious imperfection: no matter haw sincerely lhe cnlightened leaders, who 
from time to time appeared on the tap aI' lhe hierarchy 01' power. wished to'use 
their position to modernize the outdalcd social arder, socialism has proven to 
be unreformable. The truth was vcry simple: any allcmpt lo break IIp ilS 
closencss, to problematize its revolutionary dogma. to make it «more human». 
«more efticient», ar «more up-to-date». could result only in the los5 or 
«Iegitimacy» 01' the socialism's fOllndalion. What had bccn gradual1y withering 
away during the hislory af lhe communist regimes. was certainly not a «state». 
as the founding fathers of the movement had wrongly predicled. bul something 
else: a power generated by the very existence of a politicai community. a 
power, capable 01' animating a body palitic and keeping illogelhcr. The biggest 
problem and the proverbial Achilles's hcel of tOlalitarian regimes wus. accord-
ing to Hannah Arendt, thal 01' ancient tyranny. Being a carrupted 01' pcrvened 
form of governrnent «(politicai combination of force and powcrlessness»). 
condemning the rulers as well as the ruled to «impotence and futility», tyranny: 
«prevents lhe development ofpowel; lIol unl)' iII a particular segment (~rthe 
public realm but III ils enfire(v; iI gellerates. iII olher words. impotence as 
llaturally as olher bodies poli/ic generale power. .. : iI atolle is unahle to deve/np 
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enough power to remain ar all in the space of appearance, lhe public realm; 
on the cOl1trar)'~ ir deve/ops fhe germs of irs OWI1 destrm:tioll the moment it 
comes into existence»(9). 
Seen fram this point of view, the revolutions af 1989 had much less of 
positive content than some of their participants, and above ali some of the most 
outspoken outside observes of these events. would like to admit. What we 
observed, witnessed or eventually took part in, were not so much the masler-
fully concerted aclions of «velvel» revolulionaries. bul a sudden break-down of 
the delegitimized and, by its own «perestrojkas», undermined regimes. The 
c10sed systems simply collapsed down and lhe societies which had been kept 
c10sed for decades immediately started to reopen again. The revolutionary 
activilies which burSI oUl in East-Cenlral Europe during lhe annus mirabilis 
1989 were not the immediate cause of lhe collapse. bUl rather its first and the 
most visible consequence. 
As I already indicated, Dahrendorfs approach to the phenomenon of 
Eurapean revolutions - no new ideas. but rather the retum to the «old. well-
-tesled» ones - is in a way «counter-revolutionary»: «Edmund Burke argues 
eloquently that the whole point of 1688 ('U) was to prevent a revolution Iike in 
France 1789»(' J), to prevent «reigns af terror and virtuc», which characterized 
the rule of the Jacobins. ln observing East-Central Eurape 1989-1990, as he 
said at the beginning of his Ietter. «fram his Oxford study». Dahrendorf 
apparently wanted to make a similar argument and his message sent to ali post-
-communist politicians was pretty clear: 
«Neither Central Europe, nor social democracy nor an)' euphemism for 
lhe «middle lvay» must be thought of as a system. or indeed Q Utopia. if liberty 
is what l1.'e 1va1l1. The choice between freedom and ser/dom is stark and clear, 
alld iI offers no halfway house for Ihose weaker souls who wOllld like /O avoide 
making up lheir minds»( 12). 
(~) Hannah Arendt: Human Condition, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago & London, 
1958, page 202-203. 
(10) 1968 was a year of lhe «Glorious Rcvolmion» in Engbnd, and we rnighl add also 1776 of 
me American Revolution. 
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The enthusiasm of liberation musl nol obscure the reality that a choiee 
must be made here between two opposite altcrnativcs and lhat nu «third» way 
is possible between them; that lhe major issue of post-totalitarian politics is 
going to the cont1ict «betwecn auvocates 01' systems ans deCenders of lhe open 
society»(lJ). Only after Lhe «choice betwecn freedom and serfdom» is made and 
lhe existence af open society guaranteed, the normal politics can emerge, 
where a «hundred options may be on offer, and thrce ar four usually are»( "l. 
The post-communist politicians were «lo go back to the I 780s. to the lessons 
af lhe great transformations 01' that time) and to use The Federalist Papers. as 
an «unsurpassed manual 01' liberal democracy»('J): Thc biggesl threat to 
democracy in the times of transition and of disordered society, wamed James 
Madison, was weak governrnent. The key queslion is then what «republican 
remedies» can be used to make lhe governrnent stronger; how lhe emerging 
open society can be stabilizcd and protected not only against the forces 01' «the 
ancient regime», but also againsl those new polilieians who pretend lo be lhe 
speakers of the pcople but in reality serve Iheir own self-interest and seek to 
«aggrandize themselves by the confusion 01' their coulllry», in lhe words 01' the 
other Federalist, Alexander Hamilton("'). 
The relation and proper ordering 01' very dillerenl agendas in the proeess 
af transitian, the correct sequencing of «constilutional» and «normal» politics 
and the right choice and use af «repuhlican remeuics» which are eapablc' of 
making the government stronger. is, in Dahrenuorfs account. lhe kcy problem. 
The envisage ideal schedule of transilion to democraey develops, aceording to 
Dahrendarf, as follows: First comes lhe problem Df lhe cünslilution( 17). Then 
«normal» politics bursts in and the economic rcform musl be execulable within 
this environment( IKl. The key. however. lhe lenghliest process, according lo 
Dahrendorf. is the third problem: lhe emergenee 01' civil sociely: 
«The lhird cOllditiol7 Df the roud to fi'eedol11 is to provide the social foun-
dation which lransform lhe COl/stitulioll {[fui tlle eCOl/om}' fram fair-weather 
(I.l) Rulf Dahrendorf, op. dI. page 62. 
(I~) Ibid. puge 35. 
(I~) Ibid. puge 30. 
(I~) The Federnlist Pupers, Firsl letter of AlexunJer Humilton. 
(I') «The formal process of eonstilutional rcfonn 11Ikes al1easl six Illllnlhs» (Ralf Dahrendorf. ar. 
eil. puge 99). 
(I~) <,A general sense that things are looking uI' as a re:o>ull af economie refol'm is unlike1y lo 
spreud before six yeurs has pa.~ses." (ibid. pagc 99.1(0). 
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into all-weather [nstitutians capable ~f withstanding the storms generated 
wirhin and without, and s/xt)' years are barely enough to la)" lhese founda-
tiolls»(I'J). 
If at the very beginning of the revolutionary transfonnation arrives «the 
hour of the constitutional lawyers» and a little later «the hour of the politi-
cians», these two would «mean little without the hour of the citizen.»(ZO) Only 
then and not in the moment when the post-communist countries are eventually 
admitted to the European Union or NATO, the «retum to Europe» from the 
totalitarian captivity, will beco me an irreversible and undubitable reality. 
Dahrendorfs letter is not and it certainly does not want to be a masterplan 
for post-totalitarian politics of transition or a handbook to be used by post-
-tolalitarian politicians. The lucidity and depth is achieved here just because the 
author himself consciously rejects to be read that way. Having told «candidly 
his sentiments» similarly as Edmund Burke did two hundred years before him, 
Dahrendorf also concludes his letter: <<I have little 10 recommend my opinion 
but long observation and much impartiality»("). 
,,/ also like lhe way Burke winds up his epistle by describing himself as 
one who"whell the equipoise ofthe vessel in which he saUs may be endangered 
hy over-Iaading it upon one side, is desirous of carrying the small wei'ght of his 
reason to Ihat which ma)' preserve irs equipoise ". Is there a more measured 
waJ' Df describing a counterc.vclical view Df things? Liberty above ali is wha! 
/ believe in. The goal ma)' be obvious, but the path to ir has man)' pitfalls. We 
can help overcome some Df them, buf for lhe most parI our own energy and 
sellse uf purpose are called for. The resr is luck. / keep my fingers crossed and 
hope for the best. This [ do with 011 my hearr».(21) 
III 
Looking aI East-Central Europe in the spring 01' 1990 Dahrendorf certainly 
scored many good points. ln the IOdais perspective. however. his basic scheme 
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- post - totalitarian politics as a unreconcilable struggle between «udvocates 01' 
systems and defenders af opeo society» - is simple incomplctc and omits lhe 
most criticaI aspects 01' Qur current situation. Democralil.uliun. transition from 
lhe totalitarian state socialism to lhe liberal politicai ordcr of lhe Weslern type, 
is only a part 01' the proeess initiated by the revolutions 01' 1989. Ali so called 
complications 00 lhe road from serfdom to rreedom - lhe rise 01' nationalistic 
movements, lhe turmai! and civil wars in dillerent arcas 01' the post-communist 
region, the overall destabilization not only 01' East-Central Europe but 01' the 
international order in general - ali that indicates more than clearly that there is 
something wrong with the dominant understanding of the current politicai 
processes. With respects to the change aI' the politicai climate in Europe whieh 
has taken plaee between the beginning of 1990 and now, it is obvious that the 
interpretation of the meaning and the politicai implications aI' the collapse aI' 
communism, formulated in the oprimistic politicai atmosphcrc afler the great 
victory aI' liberal ideas and afler the uncondilional ""render 01' Europe's 
biggest enemy, was ar least shortsighted. or mayhe entirely mistaken('J). AI' ter 
decades af stability and rigid constellations we are approaching not the «cnd 
of history», but a period 01' uncertainty and difficult Icngth search for a new 
halance. 
First, what seems lo escape the Dahrcndorfian point 01' vicw is the hasic 
fact that the liberation ano revolutions came arter Lhe period of lotalitarian 
govemments, which did not only deprived the East-Central European ar their 
libertics and rights, bUl also closcd lhe East-Ccl1tral European societies 
«noetically», i.e. paralyzeu their membcrs as far as their capacity to live in the 
puhlic space of polis, to share une common world wilh their fellow-citizens. to 
think together abollt the «human affairs», to articulate them in speech and to 
«aet in concert»(!4). lf wc want to analyse lhe post-totalitarian development, if 
wc want to understand the basic patterns of post-totalitarian politicai culture 
and behavior, wc should al50 pay attention to that bizarre state of «epistemologic 
chaos») in which lhe post-communist socicties tind themselves in the moment 
el) A seriuos warning, as far as lhe prcscnt state uI' matler in Europe. COllll.:S, for instance. frolll 
one af lhe biggest champions anJ lhe mos! ~H;tiYe suppllrLers Df lhe ideia ar open s()(;iety in lhe pOSI-
·communist world. George Soros: ,<The collapse of lhe Soviet Unio/l Ihrealens lo bccomc a dcfeat for 
the frce world because we are railing to integratl.! Ihis regiDIl inlo lhe l'rce world am!. instead af being 
intcgrated. iI is disintegrating. Indeed. whal lISCU lo bc lhe SDvicl UIlHlll ll1ay hewme a black hole which 
may evcntually swallow up civilization.)) (Goerge Soros: Thc National Dicl;tIOrships and Open Sodety. 
expanued verslon of a Icctun: delivefed aI lhe Harvard Cluh nf Ncw Yllrk. Nnvelllber. Ig. 1992) 
("4) crr. Hannah Arendl: HUlllan Condnioll. 
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of their «re-opening»("); we should seek to understand their basic «menta]" 
condition, which is stiJl very much rooted in lheir totalitarian past; we should 
study not only the various facts of posl-communist politics, but also the post-
totalitarian politicai culture, the process of the re-invention of politics by the 
post-tolalitarian politicai mind. 
The secolld problem of lhe post-communist politicai processes in Europe 
omitted by Dahrendorf, concems the close interaction between the domestic 
and intemational change: what we are confronted with is not only the process 
of democratization (i.e. the transformation of a regime, which coJlapsed down) 
and its eventual problems and difficulties, but a dual rrallsirioll, «domestic 
transitions within ao international system itself in transition»e li ). The collapse 
of regime (state socialism, totalilarianism) in East-Central Europe has been 
aeeompanied by lhe eoJlapse of empire. Wc observe here states disintegrating 
irretrievably and being replaced by new ones. Is the agenda of a state or nation-
-building compatible with that of re-opening and demoeratizalion? Is iI not lrue 
that these two processes have very rarely fit logether in Europe's past(")? 
The rhird problem not eonsidered at aI! by Dahrendorf is a kind of 
extension af the two previous ooes. The «epistemological chaos» and lhe 
reality af «intemational system in transitian» characterize quite obviously not 
only the current situation of the post-eommunist cauntries of East-Central 
Europe. We are not dealing here with the politicai processes which can be 
eontained in the region of their origino On lhe eontrary. from the very beginning 
lhey spiJI over its borders, not only influencing decisively the situation in the 
Western part of the «old eontinent». but having also a global dimensiono Even 
lhe greatest champions af open society, even lhe regioos where this «mos! 
preeious invention of the West" has taken its deepesl roots, are wesJey-nul! 
made part of the process of post-totalitarian re-opening. What is going lo 
happen in and with East-Central Europe wil! ael as a kind of calalyzator for lhe 
politicai processes also elsewhere: detinitely, in the rest of Europe and in lhe 
Wcst in general, but also on a global scale. 
Summing IIp: With respeet to what is going on afler lhe collapse of 
communism in Europe, Dahrendorfs sharp choice «between serfdom and 
frcedom» seems to be an oversimplified bifurcation. Interpreting the post-
-communist transitions as «reopening of temporarily closed societies» only, 
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n/E Nf"TURN to 1:"URUPE 
seeing the principal problem uI' pusl-colTIlTIunist sOclcties in lhe choice to be 
made betwecn twu optiuns - «with no "lhird way" pussiblc betwcen them» -
Dahrendorl" complclcly omits lhe heart ur matlcr and blllrs the most import 
distinctions. What escapes his simpl istic dichotomy is lhat lhere is something 
more important, more powerful at stake now than the proccss af post-commu-
nist democratization and re-EuropeanisaLion; lhat this process has nut unly an 
Europeun, but also a global dimension. Whut we are living through and 
experiencing with is nol only the collapsc of commllnism, but also lhe end of 
an era in the history of mankinu. lhe mosl profound crisis af ElIropean 
civilizatiol1. 
IV 
As far as lhe diagnosis 01' lhe currcnl sla1c of Europc wc wanl to depart 
from late Edmund Husserl: Europe hus lallen intu a crisis in the twentieth 
century. What is at stake primarily is the noctic capacity 01' Europeans, the 
dominant form of European reaSlll1. i.e .. lhe scientific way of knowing. What, 
however, Husserl means by Europc? Europe. as hc tries Lo l'xplain. hus ncvcr 
heen only «a conglomeration 01' dilfcrcnt nations influcncing one anu1hcr unly 
though commercc and power struggIeS»e~). It is a historical rormation which 
in spitc uI' ali changes anu meli.lmorphoses has heen always animalcd by une 
and the sam e spirit - «a new spirit, sLcmming rmm philosophy and its panicular 
sciences, a sririt 01' free critique aml nonn-giving aimcd O1t infinile tasks. 
dominating humanily through anu lhrollgh, crcating ncw, inrinitc idcals»C'J). 
EllropC in this Husserlian scnsc means a civilizatjon, conslituted hy the Greek 
discovery 01' THEORIA. by lhe receplion uI' a certain permancnt timeless 
principie - logus and ratio: by the recognilion 1hat Lhe human !ire can be 
founded upon reasoll. 
There is no doubt. thal i1 was lhe (~eITicacious knowledgc» uf modem 
science which was born in Lhe seventecnth century in lhe philosophy 01' Galiei, 
Descartes and othcrs, cnable Europcans to improve radically the living condi-
tiuns 01' lheir societies and made Europe an indispuled hegemony in lhe world 
affairs. There was, howcver. a pricc to bc paid for Lhis speclucular sllccess. 
el EUJllunu Husser\: The Vienna Ledurc (The Crisis 01' EuropL~an Seienee~ "nu Tr:mseenuen(al 
Phenomenology_ trans by David CJ.rr. Northwestcrn lIniversity Press. Evansron J I:no, p. 28Y) 
('~) lbiJ. p. 2XY. 
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Modern seienee, warned Husserl, fell in the sam e time into trap aI' «naturalism 
and objectivism». What can modem science tell US, ir wc want lo Ieave aside 
the realm af facticity and start examining the process of scicntitic objectification 
itsel!'! What does it rest upon'! What is that, what is able to unify various 
individual acts and performances af science into some coherent whole? Is not 
a grave and strange malter thal ali questions coneerning the links between 
scientifie truths and their meaning in human Iife - ali questions which are 01' 
central importanee from the point of view of the human individual being - are 
systematically excluded as «unscicntitic»'? Is not modem science, in its hunt ror 
objective reality, losing from sight something essential for the rational way of 
living, something without which human rcason remains unintelligible to ilself. 
and that is its own subjeetivity" 
Modem science, concludeo Husserl his Vienna lecture from 1935('''), 
regardless lo its spectacular successes, has estrangcd ilself frum its original 
ideal. Beeause it is unable even to register the problem posed by the subjecti-
vity of human reason and knowledge, its rationality «is of a pieee with the 
rationality of the Egyptian pyramids»("). ln spite of its enormous potentia!, it 
suffers from the laek of rationality and that is the principal cause of the eurrent 
European crisis. 
The Husserl's response ano proposal how to escape from the ~risis aI' 
European existcncc - how to avoid «the downfall of Europe in ilS estrangcment 
from its rational sense ar life, its fall into hostility toward the spirit and into 
barbarity»(12) - is his project of transcendental phenomenology. The rationality 
of European spirit can bc sustained only if the immcdiate expcricnce is 
rehabilitated as the principal souree and point aI' departure in the noetie 
activities af Europeans. Ir a Husscrlian philosopher is to a succeed in this 
efforts to resist nihilism and skepsis threatening and literarily cating away the 
European mind in the twentieth century, he has retum to PHAINOMENA, to 
rc-estahlish lhe broken communication belwecn the rcalm af scientitic objec-
tivity and the world Df human existencc (Lebenswelt). How can he do that'! By 
adopting strictly theoretical atti tude. by turning his attention to lhe intentional 
life af thinking ego and to lhe processes 01' conslitution af «objectivity» in lhe 
subjective sphere ar human consçiousness. 
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As far as lhe basic mOlive of their philosophizing. Arcnclt. PUlOcka anel 
Vocgclin are in a perreet agreemcnl with Hllsserl. However. lheir llnderstaneling 
of response to the noetic crisis (lI' European civi lizalion if rUlldamentally 
different. Is Husserl's trancendentalism with ils ullcLJuivocal prcrcrence 01' 
thcoretical attitude anel his search for the ccrtainty ar evielcnce aml apodictic 
knowlctlge within lllc immanent sphcre 01' ego really anel adcyuale point 01' 
departure'? Is it no1 what motivatcs anel inspires the Husscrlian project critici-
zing «objectivism anel naturalism» of modern science still rooteu in lhe 
mentality 01' modem man, who has succccd in liberaling himself rrom lhe 
harJships which ance had dctermined lhe human condition hounel to lhe carth, 
bUl finds himsclf now, after he finally left the earlh wilh lhe help of seienee, 
in lhe slate 01' world alienation'~ 
The objcction Arendt, Patocka anel Vocgclin wunt to raise against Husserlian 
phcnornenology can be thus forrnulated as follows: Thcoretical altitude lo-be-
-rediscovered and re-assumeel hy a phcnomcnolngisl cannol escape lhe predica-
ments 01' human condilion, It does nol olTer an apodictic heginnillg for human 
sciencc. Theoretical attitude must he sccn and interprctcd as a possibility af 
IInite hurnan eXÍslence. as a possihility wilhin lhe reach 01' man, whosc natu.re 
is 1101 to know but, Aristotle tclls US, «lo ucsire tn knnw»('J); who is not 
SaFOS, but FILOSOFaS: who does not havc a divine kno\vledgc of lhe lhings 
hUl only HÉ ANTHROPINÉ SOFIA. i.e., is caJ1ahlc 01 linding himself in 
uporiasC.t) and rccognizing that of «escaping [his] ignorancC)}e~). 
Thc lesson to hc laken in lhe m0111cnl 01' European crisis in lhe twenlieth 
cenlury is lhat 01' humility: the openness 01' human lire - lhe hlll11an abilily to live 
in lruth - can he sustaincd only ir man is ahle to !cam to understand himself again 
not from the point 01' vicw of lhe absolute and lhe inlinite. hut wking i11tO 
consíeleration his own flllitcness é!ml limitations. IL is thc revival of negativc 
knowledge of old Socrates, what shollld he redisL'ovcred in thl' currcnt silualion. 
What is at stake is the insight lhat therc is li fundamental differencc bctween tl1e 
absnlute «divinc» wisdom anel lhe human way of knowing: hllTllanS (,.·all ollly 
know something hy keeping themsclvcs UpCIl lo lhe unknown and unknowaolc, 
hy remaining vigilant and watchful lo lhe mystcry 01' rcvclalioJl (lr Bl'-Íng. 
(H) Aristotlc 
I L.') [b](j 
(") [bill 
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The tinite nature of human noesis has ali-importante consequence: theorcti-
cal allitude sought by Husser\ - ar BIOS THEORETICOS, as the aneicnt Grceks 
pUl it - with its spccific rationality and capacity to «transccnd» cphcmeral human 
malters and ente r the realm of lrue and unehungeable being, cannot he isolated 
from other forms or modalities of «Iree» lil'e, !'rom othcr BIOI Ihal " rree and 
«open-minded» man can lead, Arendt, Patocka and Voegelin t"ke on the funda-
mentaI Husserlian motive in arder to reinterprct PROTE FILOSOFIA t'rom the 
point 01' view of revitalized, original, non-metaphysical motive 01' philosophi-
zing. They want to think not in isolation from but 011 lhe conlrary, in the context 
01' human polity and its BIOS POLITIKOS. Their aim is not to reflect on the 
politicaI phenomena from lhe distanced position af theoretician, but to engage 
the philosophical thought once again in the search for common good. The 
fundamental gaal af their meditations and reflections, is a kind 01' «lllaiciutic» 
assistance in lhe reopening Df modern politicai mind. lhe socratic «care of lhe 
soul», Philosophy in lhe twentieth century. in lhe times of European crisis «is 
called on», in lhe words 01' Patocka, 
«TO give expressjoll to what society sti/! rudely 'l-vants to say. lo give irs 
voice lo still mllfe tendencies, hUI also eX{Jose .. ""hat is behind them, to 
demonstrate their genesis, TO mark cross~roads, to idellllJ.v problems, evel1 to lry 
lo reso/\'e them. »CÓ) 
1t5 is not, and in fact could no1 ever be, a prapositionaL transferahle 
knawlege 01' an ideal world, which can be cxpressed in a 1'onn 01" lhe doctrine, 
bm «the articulation of lhe expcriencc od concrctc consciollsncss 01' concrcle 
man»C7 ), who lives in concrete sitllation. Philosophy is callcd again not only 
tu thcorize, bUI to "pUl human life to the test» (OlDONAI ELENCHON TOU 
B10U)CX) and reversely, what is at slake in our current European situation and 
whal is a decísive iSSllC today. is lhe ability ar modern Europcans to revitalize 
within lhe public spaces 01' their common world the I'orgotten tradition 01' 
politicai through having its origin (ARCHÉ) in philosophical questiono 
What about the polis these new «classicai>,("') politicai philosophcrs are 
spcaking to? Where is its public space? What is lhe common good its cilizens 
are callcd on to share and lake care of? 
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THE RETURN TO EUROPE 
For Arendt, Patocka and Voegelin, the crisis 01' European civilization, 
whose noetic dimension was introduced to the philosophical debate by Husserl, 
is first 01' ali a politicaI crisis, After World War I, Europe started to lose her 
former position of hcgemonic player in the world affairs, new and unpre-
ccdented phenomena emerged in ali spheres 01' life, undermining the European 
spirit with ali its <<infinite tasks and ideaIs» and universalistic habits and 
inclinations, Whereas the Husserl's solution of the European crisis was still 
pretty much «Europocentric»('O), Arendt, Patocka and Voegelin already knew 
that the European humanity was undergoing together with ali non-European 
civilizations and cultures, a dramatic and irreversible change, They were aware 
that the old solutions and approaches to the crises and conflicts ceased to 
function; that Europe, no malter how venerable and well-tested her principIes 
and basic ideas were, was entering an unknown and entirely unprecedented 
future; that in the power struggle which shortly aI' ter the Great War was over, 
burst gain ali ove r the world, the European cultural and spiritual heritage was 
at stake; that the «European» age in the history of mankind carne to an end in 
the twentieth century; that the most important task for European philosophy has 
beco me to respond to the challenge to the European thought presented by the 
fact of emergencc of global community 01' nations in our century and the birth 
of global civilization: to navigate its boat through the straits between Scylla of 
dogmatism and Charybdis of relativism, 
The politicaI phenomenon, which reveals «the very heart of our cen-
tury»('ll). is lhe rise Df totalitarian movements, totalitarian revolutions. totalita-
rian forms of govemment and totalitarian visions of a new world order, What 
is the nature of totalitarianism? What are its origins? What enable at least 
temporary success of the regimes which represented undoubtedly «the most 
radical denial of freedom» in the history of mankind? What lesson should be 
drawn frcm here? What are the remedies Europe and ali her heirs and 
successers should rely upon to resist the totalitarian threat? These questions 
explicitly raised by Hannah Arendt, but important without any doubt also for 
Patocka and Voegelin, point to central «noetic» problem of contemporary 
politics and pUllctllm salliens of contemporary politicaI theory, The thing is that 
il was not a brutal force and atroeities beyond measure committed by totalitar-
ian governments, as Arendt observed, what contributed most to the dissemina-
tion and consolidation of totalitarian power, but its ability to use opportunity 
(~!J) David Lt!vy. 
el ) Arcndl. 
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offered by the more and more globalized situation of mankind and to come up 
with the seditious projecl 01' global rule; lo operate successfully in lhe social 
and politicai environmenl tlooded by lhe ideological language, to paralyze lhe 
human capacity of underslanding. 
Whal becomes lhe mosl urgent philosophical problem afler lotalilarianism 
has became possible at ali within the civilization which has grown from lhe 
European heritage, was to discover and ciarify lhe symbolical forms which 
would be able to shape and cultivate the understanding of current «postmodem» 
mano What is at stake - and it explains also why tolalilarianism is even afler 
the 10lalitarians ideologies of nazism and communism were defeated still 
biggest lhreat for global civilization - is lhe absence or weakness of meaningful 
slructures in human history which could help us to find the way from our 
currCnl confusions, from our inability to articulate «lhe subject hidden behind 
lhe bland symbolism of "mankind"»(42). What could and what should serve as 
a source of unity in the pluralistic and multicullural global community? Can the 
dialogue which always was led only within the confines of concrete societies 
and their symbolical forms, be globalized and re-discovered as a part 01' the on-
-going «dialogue of mankind»(4J)? 
VI 
To conciude, I would like to go back to lhe current post-communist 
transitions. There is no doubt that the model of the «retum lo Europe» offers 
relatively good and save guidance for the process 01' re-opening 01' lhe societies 
which were kept ciosed during lhe lasl decades, isolated artilicially behind lhe 
«iron curtain}) and nQW are back in their own histories again. There is hardly 
anything else what could be recommended to Central Europeans than the ideas 
of modem liberalism, and above ali the concepl of an «open society». AI the 
sarne time, however, the sound advice seems to be to remain vigilant and 
watchful in the times 01' lhe European crisis. The democratic lraditions and the 
example and the assistance from the West might not be enough powerful 
instruments for the understanding where we are right now, for the developmenl 
of lhat skill the post-totalitarians seem lo need more than anything else: the 
capacity of right politicai judgement, the ability not only to adopt themselves 
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to the «westem climate of idcas» and to integrate thcmsclves inlo lhal stylc 01' 
life which still sccm to flourish in the wcstcrn part of I'ormerly divided 
European continent, but to aet with a clcar underslanJing of lhe novc1ty af thcir 
current siluation, 
To understand and articulate also for those who wherc not forccd to make 
a similar experience, lhe story 01" lheir totalitarian pasL seem to be one 01' the 
tasks for Central Europeuns today. The tragedy 01' Central Europe, Milan 
Kundera tried to tum attention of the West in the beginning 01' eighties, should 
become not only the impulse for retrihution 01' thuse who could be hlamed I'or 
the past evils. bus also lhe contrihutioll 01' Central Europeans to lhe dialogue 
of mankind which lhe great philosophers 01' our times slarted to provoke as 
their response to the fact that lhe modem European civilizalion rinds itself on 
the crossroads in the end of the twentieth century. 
No matter lhan in the short term perspective of post-communisl lransitions 
the arguments pointing to the crisis of European mankind might look too 
academic, unconvincing and with very low politicai impact, they dellnitely will 
have their place in the long-term perspective, at least iI' it is truc that Central 
ElIropeans believe that Europe, as une project among olhers in the framcwork 
of emerging global civilization, is also their future. Not taking the model (lI' 
«crisis of European civilizatian» into seriolls consideration in lhe debate.s on 
post-commllnist transitions is certainly pussibJe and might he seen as a SiTIart 
move how to prote-ct and even furlhcr disscminate ali venerahle, «wcll tested» 
liberal ideas, whose time has come according lO people likc with the collapse 
ar communism. Those who hold this view should he. however, vcry cautions. 
Because what looked like clear victory of I'rcedolll oveI' scrfdolll rivL' years ago. 
and now still is presenteu as thc onJy plausible alternativc. may end up being 
indeed a proverbial Pyrrhic viclOry 01' future. 
Martin PoJuus 
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